

**BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER
AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND**



**AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND INSPECTION
CHECKLIST 32-7**

1 JUNE 1999

Civil Engineering

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACCIDENT RESPONSE

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This checklist reflects Command requirements for Civil Engineer units to prepare for and conduct internal reviews.

1. References have been provided for each critical item. Critical items have been kept to a minimum and are related to public law, safety, security, fiscal responsibility, and/or mission accomplishment. While compliance with non-critical items is not rated, these items help gauge the effectiveness/efficiency of the function.
2. This publication establishes a baseline checklist. The checklist will also be used by the Command IG during applicable assessments. Use the checklist at Attachment 1 as a guide only. Add to or modify each area as needed, but not less stringent than the specified reference, to ensure an effective and thorough review of the unit Nuclear Weapons Accident Response program.

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The Civil Engineer

Attachment 1

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACCIDENT RESPONSE

Table A1.1. Checklist.

SECTION 1: NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACCIDENT RESPONSE			
MISSION STATEMENT: Protect the public, mitigate public health and safety concerns, and lessen the effects in the event of major accident/incident involving nuclear weapons			
NOTE: All references are from AFMAN 32-4004, unless otherwise noted.			
1.1. CRITICAL ITEMS:	YES	NO	N/A
1.1.1. Has the installation developed an OPLAN which addresses adequate response procedures to a Nuclear Weapon Accident to alleviate dangerous exposure of personnel? (AFI 32-4001, para 2.2, A3.5, and AFI 91-101, para 9.5.4)			
1.1.2. Does the installation have capability to respond to accidents involving nuclear weapons and their components? (AFI 32-4001, para 4.1.2.)			
1.1.3. Are firefighting plans developed for all locations where nuclear weapons and/or systems are present? (AFI 91-101, para 9.5.4.)			
1.1.4. Has each unit with nuclear weapons accident response requirements developed supporting checklists which address their specific tasks for response? (paragraph 2.2.4, AFI 32-4001)			
1.1.5. Has the installation commander ensured that the disaster response force (DRF) is staffed and equipped to respond to a nuclear weapons accident? (paragraph 1.11, AFI 32-4001)			
1.1.6. Is an NBC contamination control capability, as applicable, assigned, trained, and equipped for CE, transportation, medical, and aircraft maintenance decontamination control operations? (AFI 32-4001, para 1.13 and AFMAN 32-4004, para 1.5.2)			
1.1.7. Did the DRF perform emergency operations to save lives & provide fire protection? (para 2.3.1)			
1.1.8. Did the DRF establish command and control? (paragraph 2.3)			
1.2. NON-CRITICAL ITEMS:			
1.2. NON-CRITICAL ITEMS:	YES	NO	N/A
1.2.1. Did the DRF determine the presence of contamination at the accident and around the cordon perimeter? (paragraph 2.3.2.2)			
1.2.2. Did the DRF establish a national defense area (NDA) as required? (para 2.3.2.2)			
1.2.3. Did the DRF document the names of civilian and military personnel who were at the accident site? (paragraph 2.3.2.2)			
1.2.4. Did EOD advise the OSC on weapons recovery and supervise the initial render safe procedures as required? (paragraph 1.2.5.6)			

1.2.5. Did the senior fire representative take command of the on-scene operations to designate an entry control point (ECP) and initial cordon size until arrival of the on-scene commander (OSC)? (paragraph 1.2.5.5)			
1.2.6. Did the public affairs representative prepare news releases according to AFI 35-102? (AFI 35-102, paragraphs 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6 and AFM 32-4004, para 1.2.14)			
1.2.7. Did the bioenvironmental engineer: (paragraph 1.2.8.)			
1.2.7.1. Evaluate the occupational, radiological, and environmental health hazards at or near the accident?			
1.2.7.2. Determine the personnel protection requirements for people entering the cordon?			
1.2.7.3. Coordinate with the medical representative regarding monitoring and decontamination of casualties?			
1.2.7.4. Work with DP on personnel monitoring and contamination control station (CCS) procedures?			
1.2.7.5. Coordinate with mortuary affairs to determine procedures for decontamination of remains? (paragraph 1.2.8 for the above sub-bullets)			
1.2.8. Did the security representative (SF): (paragraph 1.2.6.)			
1.2.8.1. Establish entry control procedures to limit access to the site?			
1.2.8.2. Establish a disaster cordon to include perimeter security and entry/exit control?			
1.2.8.3. Coordinate with civilian law enforcement as required?			
1.2.8.4. Ensure that classified material is protected? (para 1.2.6 for all of the above sub-bullets)			
1.2.9. Did the weather representative advise the OSC on meteorological conditions that might affect the operation? (paragraph 1.2.17)			
1.2.10. Did the installation ensure notification of the Nuclear Weapons Accident was reported to higher headquarters & the National Military Command Center (NMCC)? (Attachment 2, Checklist #3, AFMAN 10-206, Table 3.3 and AFMAN 32-4004, para 2.2)			
1.2.11. Was an initial contamination control station (CCS) established for monitoring and decontaminating personnel leaving the accident site? (paragraph 1.2.5.4)			
1.2.12. Were transportation routes monitored and decontaminated as required for medical vehicles leaving the cordon? (ACC Plan 32-1, Annex E, Appendix 10, para 3d.)			
1.2.13. Did firefighters at the accident site use TO11N-20-11(C) for firefighting guidance? (paragraph 10-28e(5))			

1.2.14. Did SF forces provide complete protection for nuclear weapons, associated components, and classified material? (paragraph 1.2.6)			
1.2.15. Did SF maintain the minimum public withdrawal distance as directed by AFMAN 91-201 and TO 11A-1-46? (paragraph 2.24.2, TO 11N-20-11)			
1.2.16. Did the OSC determine the presence of contamination and report it as soon as possible? (paragraphs 1.2.4 and 2.3.2.2)			
1.2.17. Was an initial perimeter survey done outside and downwind of cordon to determine if contamination existed? (paragraph 1.2.5.4)			
1.2.18. Did IREs establish OSCP outside the disaster cordon, either upwind or crosswind of the accident site? (paragraph 2.3.2.2.)			
1.2.19. Did DRF members brief their replacements on actions taken, actions needed, and the general status of the operation? (paragraph 2.6.2)			
1.2.20. Did the Readiness Flight provide OPREP-3 reports through the installation command post? (paragraphs 1.2.5.4 and AFI 10-206)			
1.2.21. Did IREs determine the presence of contamination both at the accident and around the cordon perimeter? (para 1.2.5.4 and 2.3.2.2)			